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Abstract 
The Government Pension Fund Global and its investment strategy is widely discussed and 
criticised by many. Financial institutions solely investing in development projects, like 
Norfund, have in some studies been identified to outperform traditional profit maximizing 
investment strategies, like the Government Pension Fund Global.  
In this thesis, the return of capital for the Government Pension Fund Global and Norfund are 
predicted from a simple neoclassical production model and the subsequent Lucas Paradox, 
and compared to the funds’ actual historical returns. The research does however not provide 
any significant evidence supporting the funds’ mean of returns to be unequal.   
Acknowledging the two funds’ return on capital to be statistically equivalent implies that 
neither the prediction from the simple neoclassical model nor the Lucas Paradox can be 
observed in the sampled data.  Accordingly, the provided empirical analysis does not support 
the above statement of Norfund outperforming the Government Pension Fund Global.  
The further discussion points out limitations regarding human capital, technology and 
infrastructure and institutions as possible explanations for the differences between the 
neoclassical predictions and the observed returns.  
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 Introduction 1.
Discovering oil on the Norwegian continental shelf has unquestionably had a huge impact on 
the Norwegian wealth. To limit the effect of the temporary gift on the Norwegian economy, 
the Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG) was established. The so called 
fiscal rule involves a 4% pay-out ratio for the fund, included in the Norway’s national 
budget. The fiscal rule is supposed to reflect the long term real expected return of the GPFG. 
The fund is meant to increase future Norwegians purchasing power; which also is the 
meaning of the term “pension fund” in its name. The fund’s name and main objective causes 
the citizens of Norway to be interpreted as the owners of the fund, even if the Ministry of 
Finance is the formal owner. The management and the size of the fund attract domestic and 
international attention, which requires great transparency and consistency of its management.  
Even though the GPFG critics are numerous, the chosen focus of this thesis is to what extent 
the portfolio is tilted towards developed economies. The fund is often accused to avoid 
contributing in developing countries. One side of the debate includes political and spillover 
effects, implying whether or not the capital should be invested as a political tool or in the 
purpose of generating spillover effects
1
 increasing development in challenged economies. 
The other side of the debate addresses how to maximize the portfolio return. The Ministry of 
Finance is constantly stating that the overall objective for the fund is to maximize its profits, 
hence simple returns
2
 are also the focus of this thesis. Politics and spillover effects is 
therefore not quantified and incorporated in the sampled data. Other effects than short term 
revenues for investing in developing countries will to some extent be discussed in chapter 7.  
To study the topic of responsible investments in the GPFG the fund has been compared to 
Norfund, which objective is to ensure capital flows to sustainable companies in developing 
countries. Norfund is part of a sister organization called Developing Financial Institution 
(DFI), which by some are claimed to deliver higher rates of returns simultaneously as the 
funds contribute to improvement in challenged regions in the global economy. An example 
                                                 
1 Spillover effects do here includes decreased unemployment, access to critical goods, increased taxable revenues, enhanced 
basic services, reduced poverty in general (International Financial Corporation, 2011). 
2 Simple returns are here interpreted as an investment’s profit before tax and interest hence the actual capital gain.   
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of such studies is Sony Kapoor’s “Investing in the future” commissioned by the Norwegian 
Church Aid. In Kapoor’s report Norfund is claimed to outperform the GPFG, and therefore 
Kapoor recommends the GPFG’s mandate to incorporate a similar investment strategy 
(Kapoor, 2013).  
Kapoor’s findings were somehow surprising, as fundamentals of finance entails rather 
conservative expectations for excess returns. However, different angles of the comparison 
could cause different conclusions. It was therefore interesting to test if the funds’ officially 
reported return, excluding all kinds of spillover effects, would confirm Kapoor’s findings. 
The simple neoclassical production model and the Lucas Paradox were applied to investigate 
the returns of the two funds. In this way this thesis tests Norfund’s ability to outperform the 
GPFG, and if so, to what extent this is predicted by economic theories.  
After a thorough brainstorming process the thesis is spun out of a genuine interest for the 
Norwegian oil wealth and the asset management of the GPFG. The curiosity for 
understanding how alternative investment approaches could increase the value of the 
portfolio has resulted to the following key question:  
How do a simple neoclassical model and the subsequent Lucas Paradox predictions 
correspond to the historical returns of the Government Pension Fund Global and Norfund?   
The key question is gradually answered through the eight chapters firming this thesis. In 
chapter 2 relevant background information for the analysis is provided. Chapter 3 describes 
the theoretical framework and its predication regarding the GPFG and Norfund. The 
obtained data and its challenges for comparability will be clarified in chapter 4. In chapter 5 
the empirical analysis and the findings will be revealed. The following chapter 6 will discuss 
possible explanation of the findings in the empirical analysis. Chapter 7 is a further 
discussion addressing the on-going debate regarding responsible investments in the GPFG. 
Summary remarks are stated in chapter 8.    
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 Background  2.
In the following chapter the history and the current situation of the GPFG and Norfund will 
be presented. The management and the strategy of the GPFG are largely discussed, and 
compared to funds with different investment approaches. In this study the GPFG was 
assessed along with Norfund, which is also involved with the Norwegian Government. The 
characteristics of the two funds will be addressed, especially in regards to the variation of the 
mandates that the funds are given. The addressed dissimilarities will be subject to the further 
empirical analysis and discussion.        
2.1 Discovering oil and counterforcing the Dutch Disease  
The Norwegian oil adventure has had a tremendous effect on the Norwegian economy since 
the Ekofisk reservoir was confirmed in December 1969 (Norsk Olje og Gass, 2010). After a 
period of investing in facilities for the new industry, production became profitable. In the 
wake of the oil discovery the consumptions growth rates increased. A situation that can be 
interpreted as increased living standards due to borrowing the expected petroleum resource 
rents (Holmøy & Heide, 2005). To counter this challenge it was suggested in 1983 to 
establish a fund of the savings of the temporary large revenues from the petroleum sector. 
The intention was to limit the consumptions of the revenues to the real return on 
accumulated financial assets, forming the fiscal rule. In this way, the Norwegian 
Government tries to avoid the so-called Dutch Disease
3
.  
The dreaded disease has been observed in countries where a temporary increased income 
entails a de-industrialisation in the economy, causing unsustainable expansion in public 
services and social welfare. The situation becomes damaging for a nation’s economy when 
its increased revenue and its reduced manufacturing sector create a shift in the demand of 
goods causing the domestic prices to rise. The country’s demand for goods exceeds its 
production, triggering the nation’s currency to appreciate compared to other countries. In 
that case the nation’s export becomes relatively expensive compared to other countries, and 
the imports become cheaper. The manufacturing sector can be described to be less 
                                                 
3 The Dutch Disease is a phenomenon named by the challenging economic situation in the Netherlands that followed the 
nation’s discovery of gas in 1959. 
4 
competitive, possibly making the economy to suffer from trade deficit (Holmøy & Heide, 
2005; Norman & Orvedal, 2010). When such a challenging economic situation is reversed, it 
may be further exacerbated by increased unemployment in the country. However, Norman & 
Ovredal (2010) argues that the Norwegian economy never will be threatened by these issues 
due to the establishment of the GPFG and the fiscal rule. The fiscal rule is claimed to reflect 
a sustainable equilibrium of demand and production.  
2.2 The GPFG and its challenges    
From the fund’s inception in 1996 its investment strategy and size has been continually 
enhanced. The GPFG is today the world largest sovereign wealth fund, holding 
approximately 1.25% of the world’s stocks (Kapoor, 2013). Figure 1 illustrates the historical 
development of the market value of the portfolio and further prediction until 2020. The 
graph indicates a tremendous growth of the invested portfolio, and last year the value of the 
portfolio exceeded one million kroner per capita.  
 
Figure 1) The GPFG’s accumulated portfolio value4 (billion NOK) 
(Finansdepartementet, 2013; NBIM, 2014e; Regjerningen, 2014) 
                                                 
4 4% real return are deducted from the historical and predicted values, in accordance with the established fiscal rule. 
  5 
Even though the fund in many ways is interpreted as successful, it has been widely discussed 
and also criticised by many. The reported average real return, deducted for management cost 
and inflation, is 3.6%, i.e. lower than the fiscal rule of 4.0%. Hence the fund is 
underperforming its long-term target return, which is problematic. It can be  argued that the 
fund’s restrictions inhibit potential increased returns, for example alternative investments 
like private equity. Another example of restriction is how annualized standard deviation for 
the relative return between portfolio and its benchmark, the tracking error, shall not exceed 
1.0% (NBIM, 2014c). This restriction can be said to limit the GFPG possibility to act like an 
actual active investor, gaining excess return from stock picking.  
Another debated issue is the GPFG’s ability to adapt to new markets and perform a 
responsible investment strategy. As a result the Strategy Council was asked to examine the 
fund’s responsible investment strategy in 2013. The assessed report of the Strategy Council 
does among other things acknowledging the complexity and challenges regarding efficiently 
organisation and management of the fund. The complexity of the organisational structure can 
easily be misinterpreted. Especially can exclusions of companies or markets unfortunately be 
interpreted as political actions by the Norwegian Government.  
The Ministry of Finance has the formal responsibility of the Fund, while the operational 
responsibility has been delegated to the Norwegian Central Bank and the subdivision Norges 
Bank Investment Management (NBIM). NBIM’s task is to ensure the fund’s return for the 
fixed mandate (NBIM, 2014b). In addition, the Council of Ethics provides recommendations 
on exclusions to the Ministry of Finance. Figure 2 below describes the structure of the 
communication flow of instructions and the reporting of responsible investments in the 
GPFG. The wide arrows with text illustrate the downward communication in the hierarchy, 
while the narrow arrows indicate the upward communication in the structure of organizations 
(Dimson, Kreutzer, Lake, Sjo, & Starks, 2013).  
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Figure 2) Structure of tasks regarding responsible investments in GPFG 
(Dimson et al., 2013) 
2.3 Disparities between the GPFG and Norfund 
Kapoor (2013) argues in his study that the returns of a  DFI can outperform the GPFG’s 
current returns, using Norfund as an example. Norfund’s investment strategy differs from the 
GPFG as it is not profit maximizing, but established to contribute capital for development of 
sustainable commercial activities in emerging markets (Norfund, 2013). In this way Norfund 
helps companies which otherwise struggle with funding due to high risk or lack of capital. 
The organization claims that their ability to be exposed to higher risk is due to its hybrid 
state-owned structure, directly related to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, through the 
Norwegian development assistance budget (Norfund, 2013).  
Both Norfund and the GPFG argue to behave as active investors. The distinction is however 
that Norfund gives actual business development support. Norfund argues that this form of 
active ownership will contribute to better investments and gives the opportunity to focus on 
the project that gives strong development effects, hence amplifying these effects.  
In the GPFG’s overall portfolio, the equity portfolio corresponds to 60% of the strategic 
benchmark, while the bond portfolio constitutes 40% of the index, less the share of real 
estate investments. The benchmark portfolios are mainly provided by world market indexes, 
tilted towards developed countries (NBIM, 2014c). Norfund’s strategy classifies the fund’s 
operations in three different sectors: renewable energy financial services and agriculture 
(Norfund, 2013). The selected sectors are found to be particularly important for development 
  7 
effects when they are well run. Functioning banking systems and accessibility to electricity 
is identified to be critical infrastructure for development (The World Bank Group, 2008). 
Both banking and renewable energy is also industries where Norway access expertise that 
can be utilised across borders (Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, & Volosovych, 2008).  
The last important distinction from the GPFG is that Norfund not operate with a specified 
target return. The argumentation for this is that target returns potentially prevent high-risk 
investment. A given target for the portfolio may have caused shifts in the initial mandate, 
away from difficult regions, to projects with lower risk and higher overall profitability. 
Norfund argues that this strategy helps the fund maximizing development effects (Norfund, 
2013). This is identified as one of the current problems regarding the responsible investment 
strategy in the GPFG (Dimson et al., 2013). 
Figure 3 sums up the some highlighted facts for the two funds, to easier get an impression of 
the funds’ size, geographical presence, main objectives and important characteristics of the 
holdings. 
 
Figure 3) Highlighted facts for the GPFG and Norfund 
8 
2.3.1 Geographical allocation 
The equity portfolio stands for the majority of the GPFG total holdings. A simplification in 
the following analysis is therefore that the geographical allocation of the equity portfolio 
represents the fund’s total portfolio. The actual geographical allocation of the equity 
portfolio is visualized in Figure 4. The pie diagrams illustrate how the portfolio is tilted 
towards developed countries, and only 9.0% of the total equity portfolio is invested in 
emerging markets. The five countries which hold the biggest part of the GPFG’s portfolio 
will therefore represent the GPFG, namely the United States, United Kingdom, France, 
Germany and Japan. The corresponding GDPs per capita are summed up in Table 1. 
 
Figure 4) The GPFG’s actual geographical allocation for the equity portfolio 
per 31.3.2014 (NBIM, 2014a) 
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Table 1) GDP per capita (US $) representing the GPFG5 (The World Bank 
Group, 2014) 
This allocation is vital to be able to obtain appropriate data to test the predictions of the 
simple neoclassical production model.  
To ensure the required expertise and knowledge in the organization, Norfund has 
concentrated the fund’s investment to a limited number of countries (Norfund, 2013). Africa 
is the dominating region, with over 50% of the fund’s holdings. Sufficient addition expertise 
is also provided through certain key partners in the regions. The geographical allocation of 
Norfund’s portfolio is roughly described in the preliminary financial report published on the 
fund’s web site. Figure 5 is based on the key figures presented in the preliminary report of 
2013. 
 
Figure 5) Geographical allocation of Norfund's holdings 2013 (Norfund, 
2014b) 
                                                 
5 The World Bank Group’s calculations for the GDP is done by summarizing each the countries’ gross value added by all 
producers in the economy and any product taxes, and by deducting any subsidies not included in the value of the products. 
Depreciation of fabricated assets, degradation and depletion of natural resources are not deduced. The presented GDP per 
capita is the described GDP over each county’s midyear population (The World Bank Group, 2014a). 
GDP per capita (current US$) 2012
United States 51749
Japan 46731
United Kingdom 38920
France 39746
Germany 42597
Average 43949
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According to Figure 5 and statements in Norfund’s latest reports, Southern and East Africa 
are indicated to be the fund’s focus, hence it is reasonable to obtain data for further 
calculation from these regions. Accompanied by UNICEF’s definition of Southern and East 
Africa, Table 2 represents the countries with its respective GDPs per capita used for 
computing an average of the region’s average GDP per capita.  
 
Table 2) GDP per capita (US $) representing Norfund (The World Bank 
Group, 2014a; UNICEF, 2014) 
2.4 Political aspects 
The objectives for the two funds identify an important difference between the two funds. 
While the Ministry of Finance constantly states that the overall purpose of the fund is to 
maximize the nation’s future purchasing power, Norfund strive to maximize the 
development effect of its investments.  
In the long run, the GPFG’s profit maximizing strategy is depending on sustainable 
development in economic, environmental and social terms. Increased returns are also 
GDP per capita (current US$)
Angola 5482
Botswana 7238
Burundi 251
Comoros 831
Eritrea 504
Kenya 943
Lesotho 1193
Madagascar 447
Malawi 268
Mozambique 565
Namibia 5786
Rwanda 620
Seychelles 12783
South Africa 7352
South Sudan 943
Swaziland 3042
Tanzania 609
Uganda 551
Zambia 1463
Zimbabwe 714
Average 2579
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connected to well-functioning, legitimate and effective markets (NBIM, 2014c). However, 
this is not the overall target for the GPFG as it is for Norfund. 
This distinction in the funds’ investment strategies is important to acknowledging as it 
reveals the duplicity in the debate regarding the responsible investment in the GPFG. The 
critics can be categorized into two sections, political and financial issues.  
For the purpose of this thesis, the political aspects have not been included in the empirical 
analysis, due to its time limitation and complexity of quantifying spillover effects of 
investing in emerging markets. Political considerations will however be discussed in some 
extent in chapter 7. It is also important to notice that the current government has signalized 
that the fund’s investment strategy will remain unchanged, thus focused on increased 
purchasing power through returns. Assuming no dramatic changes of the fund’s mandate in 
the coming years, the debated political issues of its investments will not be relevant unless it 
causes the fund’s returns to change.   
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 Theoretical Framework 3.
In Lucas (1990) the contradiction between the predictions of an international version of a 
simple neoclassical model of production and the observed capital flows is described (Lucas, 
1990; NBIM, 2012). The prediction from the simple neoclassical model is that capital flows 
should take place from rich to poor
6
 countries. However, what we observe is that gross 
capital flows mainly take place between rich countries. Net flows from rich to poor countries 
have actually been negative in recent decades (NBIM, 2012).   
3.1 A Simple Neoclassical Production Model  
In Robert E. Lucas Jr.’s research in 1990 “Why Doesn’t Capital Flow from Rich to Poor 
Countries?”, he questions and tests the limitations of a neoclassical model regarding trade 
between rich and poor countries. The research is based on a simple one-periodic neoclassical 
model and can be derived by the economies of two countries, which produces the same good 
with the same constant returns to scale production function, Y. Y is interpreted as a country’s 
gross domestic product, GDP. The production function relates output to homogeneous 
capital and labour input. Another assumption for the model is that both countries have the 
same level of technology (Lucas, 1990). Any differences in production per worker are 
therefore caused by variances in levels of capital per worker for the two countries. The 
marginal product of capital is higher in the less productive economies, this is called the Law 
of Diminishing Returns. If the Law of Diminishing Returns holds, trade in capital goods is 
free and competitive, and new investments will occur in poor economies. This will continue 
until capital-labour ratios are equalized, affecting the wages and capital return. In the 
following a simple neoclassical production model will be described to further present and 
explain Lucas’ findings. 
 
                                                 
6 Poor countries are interpreted as countries with low GDP per capita, while rich countries have high GDP per capita. Other 
terms related to this topic is emerging/emerged markets and developing/developed countries. Emerging markets are not 
distinctly different from other markets in other ways than that the markets are rapidly catching up from a lower base 
(Khanna & Palepu, 2010). Developing countries concerns countries where the majority lives on far less money, and with far 
fewer basic public services, than people in industrialized countries (The World Bank, 2012). 
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A simple version of a neoclassical production function is the so called Cobb-Douglas 
function:  
1)          , 
where A is the level of technology, L is the country’s aggregated labour and K is the total 
capital.   is capital share per labour.   
Let x be capital per worker and y be income per worker:  
2)  
 
 
       
 
  
 , 
and substitute x into 1): 
3)           (
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The return of capital is denoted r and is given by the marginal product of the capital:  
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Hence the marginal capital returns of production (both per worker) is given by the following 
derivation:  
6) 
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Notice how       
  
  
  , i.e. the larger y, the lower r. The implication of the above 
derivation is that the return on capital should be higher in poor relative to rich countries. 
When perfect international capital mobility is introduced, capital will flow to the countries 
with highest rates of return. In the model world, the initial poor countries are predicted to 
obtain the highest rates of return. The capital should flow from wealthy to poor nations, and 
no investment in rich countries would be expected. This process is predicted to continue 
14 
until the rates of capital returns are globally equalized. This result will be limited by the 
assumptions for the model. 
By the construction of the funds’ mandates, the GPFG’s equity portfolio is tilted towards 
relatively rich and developed nations, while Norfund consequently invests in emerging and 
poor economies. This identification makes it possible to forecast the expected return on 
capital for each of the funds, based on the above simple neoclassical theory. If the world 
markets were somewhere close to efficient like the model assumes, return on capital, r, 
would be predicted to be significantly higher for Norfund than for the GPFG.  
3.1.1 The Lucas Paradox 
Lucas studied the mismatch between actual capital flows and predicted capital flows from 
neoclassical theories. Lucas computed a very simple evidence of the inappropriate 
assumptions for the neoclassical model, based on the two countries USA and India. Using 
the differences in production per worker, the American production was fifteen times what it 
was in India. The technology, A, is assumed to be constant and a given capital share
7
 of 
     . With these simplifications Lucas argued that the marginal product in India should 
be          times the marginal product of capital in the United States. In that case capital 
would flow from the United States to India, expecting no other investment to wealthy 
countries. As we do not observe such large flows of capital, Lucas studied possible 
explanations for this.     
There are some difficulties with the assumptions for the neoclassical model, which Lucas 
(1990) discussed. The Lucas Paradox points out three considerable limitations of the 
neoclassical theory: Differences in Human Capital, External Benefits of Human Capital and 
Capital Market Imperfection (Lucas, 1990).    
1. Differences in Human Capital 
Standard neoclassical theories do not take into account the possible differences in efficiency 
for labour input. This limitation in the regular models will ignore the variety in labour 
quality, called human capital per worker.  
                                                 
7       is the average capital share of USA and India in Lucas (1990). 
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By implying estimates for differences in human capital Lucas shows that the predicted y 
does decrease for poor countries. Lucas highlights this finding by replacing unadjusted 
labour with effective labour, resulting differences in return on capital for the two test 
countries to be smaller. However, the differences were still large enough to lead to 
expectations of capital flows from rich to poor countries (Lucas, 1990).  
Lucas also points out that with constant returns, equal capital returns causes equal wages for 
equal labour. In that case, there will be no motives for flows of labour as long as there is no 
economic motive for capital flow. Still, immigration rates from poor to rich countries are at 
the maximum according to rules of immigration. Lucas argues that the immigration from 
Mexico to USA is clear evidence that the actual capital flow cannot fully be explained by 
differences in human capital, excluded by substituting with effective labour rates (Lucas, 
1990). The mentioned stream from Mexico to USA still exists, and we have also observed 
similar streams from Eastern to Western Europe in the last decades. Hence, the Lucas 
Paradox can be argued to be just as present today considering these examples of cross 
country human capital flows.   
2. External Benefits of Human Capital 
In his further analysis Lucas (1990) assumed that an economy’s technology level is the 
average level of its workers’ human capital raised to a power, changing the product function. 
The new function presents the income per effective worker and a new variable for human 
capital was established. The new variable was interpreted as external effects. 
The surprising result of this technique is that taking external effects of human capital into 
account entirely eliminates the differences in predicted returns between the test countries 
(Lucas, 1990). 
This cross-country comparison is based on an important assumption that external benefits of 
a country’s stock of human capital accrue entirely to producers within the same country, and 
acknowledging spillovers across countries is non-existing (Lucas, 1990).  
If the above limitation is ignored, Lucas’ research suggests that when human capital 
differentials are corrected the predicted difference in returns between rich and poor nations is 
dramatically reduced, and possible fully absent if knowledge spillovers are local enough.  
16 
3. Capital Market Imperfections  
The hitherto used statements represent a mindset that treats flows as borrowing contracts 
across borders. Poor countries acquire capital from wealthy nations today, and in return they 
have a promising future with good flows to the rich countries in the days to come. If such an 
arrangement should be attainable, and in order to create a competitive equilibrium, there 
must be an effective mechanism ensuring international borrowing agreements. Lacking 
effective mechanisms like these are referred to as market imperfections, and are often 
included in the term “political risk”. The most serious difficulty with political risk is that 
some of the explanation of the cash flow inadequacy lies in the novelty of the current 
political arrangement between rich and poor countries. Regarding market imperfections, 
Lucas’ study concludes that restrictions on capital flows from the borrowing country can be 
explained by mistrust of foreigners or a reluctance to let development proceed too fast 
(Lucas, 1990). 
The Lucas’ report concludes that the effects of Human Capital successfully can be 
incorporated in the simple neoclassical model. Therefore the human capital issue cannot be 
interpreted to comprehensive explain the unexpected, negative capital flow between poor 
and rich countries. The political risk and market imperfections, on the other hand, are seen as 
important factors in the limitations of capital flows.  
To conclude, Norfund’s mandate to entirely invest in developing and emerging markets 
results in the fund’s portfolio being particularly vulnerable to political risks. According to 
the Lucas Paradox, political risk is a decisive consideration of why capital flows to such 
regions are negative. A further prediction is that the Lucas Paradox may cause Norfund’s 
return on capital to decrease. 
3.1.2 The neoclassical prediction for the GPFG and Norfund 
Recalling the representative geographical allocation for the two funds in section 2.3.1, a 
simplified average of GDP per capita for the relevant countries was computed.  
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Fund Average GDP per capita  
The Government Pension Fund Global 43 949 USD 
Norfund 2 579 USD 
Table 3) Average GDP per capita in invested regions (The World Bank 
Group, 2014a) 
Table 3 sums up the average GDP per capita for the relevant regions. Let the average GDP 
for the countries heavily represented in the GPFG portfolio be denoted       and 
correspondingly          for Norfund. The ratio of GDPs for the regions can be computed:  
     
        
 
         
        
    
Hence it can be argued that the countries represented in the GPFG have a production per 
person about seventeen times the investment region in Norfund’s portfolio.  
When applying the same argumentation
8
 as Lucas (1990) did when the Lucas Paradox was 
established, the differences in production per person in the two identified regions would 
cause Norfund’s marginal product of capital to be          the marginal product of capital 
in the investment regions of GPFG
9
. This represents a great difference in expected returns 
for the two funds.  
 
 
                                                 
8 Constant level of technology, A, and a given capital share of      . 
9 According the simple neoclassical model:       (           )
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 Data  4.
Holding mainly publically traded securities is reflected by the GPFG’s annual reports, 
providing a range of key figures. The GPFG’s returns were therefore straightforwardly 
retrieved from the fund’s latest produced reports at the Ministry of Finance’s web page.    
The presented returns for the Norfund is based on the organization’s official reports on 
operation from 2008 – 2012, retrieved from the fund’s web site. After conversations with 
Norfund, there has also been possible to obtain calculations of returns for the years 2002-
2007 and 2013. There was no realization of Norfund’s holdings from the fund’s inception in 
1997 until 2002; hence including this period in the sample population is not considered to be 
appropriate. 
Due to the limited amount of available data for Norfund and both funds’ relatively short 
existence, only twelve years of data was successfully obtained for the empirical analysis. 
The implications of the limited sampled data will be discussed in section 5.2 Requirements 
for the t-test.   
4.1 Comparability  
To be able to conduct the empirical analysis in chapter 5, it was necessary to clarify some 
challenges in the sampled data. Identification of these challenges and the provided 
enhancements are meant to prepare the comparability of the data samples. Firstly, issues 
regarding the two funds initial reported returns are discussed. In section 4.1.2 impacts of 
management costs are incorporated for the further analysis.  
4.1.1 Return calculations  
The GPFG’s presented annual returns are based on time-weighted monthly rate of returns, 
using the geometric average of the assets trading prices. Fair value of the assets is 
determined on the day the external cash flow, generating geometric interim returns. Fair 
value is the predicted realizable value of an asset or the assumed cost of settling a liability 
between willing and informed partners (NBIM, 2014d).  
Norfund does on the other hand use the internal rate of return (IRR) as an estimate for the 
actual return of its investments. The IRR is based on estimations of the future cash flows for 
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the investments, and valuations of the projects at the end of each year (Norfund, 2013). The 
actual fair value of a project will not be known until the investment is realized in the market. 
Not being able to obtain current market prices of the investments creates uncertainty in 
evaluating the fund’s value and rate of returns.  
In regards of the mentioned observations, it is important to recognize the impact of such 
differences of the reported numbers for GPFG and Norfund, and try to reduce these effects 
as much as possible. The following discussion emphasis the assumptions and simplification 
done to dispute these issues, and therefore incorporated for the further analysis. 
Currency fluctuations 
To exclude effects of fluctuations in currencies, the returns used for further calculations are 
returns based on the local currency of the actual investment. For both the GPFG and Norfund 
it is important to stress that it is the return in international currency that are relevant to 
measure international purchasing power.  
Inflation 
For simplicity, the inflation effects for both funds are ignored. If this effect should have been 
included, the inflation must have been corresponding to the chosen currency. In this report 
the returns are processed in their local currency, hence the inflation issue must also been 
weighted for the same currency and country.   
Geometric averages 
The geometric return represents the average weighted return over time, while the arithmetic 
return is a simple average of the return for a given period. As the compounding effect 
generated by the geometric average causes differences in the two types of returns, it is 
appropriate to arrange the geometric returns for funds like the GPFG and Norfund (Bodie, 
Kane, & Marcus, 2011; Finansdepartementet, 2012). The computation of geometric average 
return for Norfund was therefore essential for the comparably of data. The computation and 
its effects on Norfund’s returns are shown in Appendix 1.   
4.1.2 Management costs 
The management cost for a fund is crucial in evaluating the funds’ performance. A big fund 
is likely to develop economies of scale due to its size and ability to utilize internal expertize 
in the asset management. Economies of scale for a fund can be visible in low management 
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cost. Due to monitoring cost of the portfolio, actively managed fund is expected to cause 
higher managerial costs than passively managed funds. However studies have also proven 
that sovereign wealth funds performing an active monitoring of its holdings are associated 
with abnormal returns for the firm acquired, while the holdings of passive funds 
underperforms (Bortolotti, Fotak, & Megginson, 2013).         
The Government Pension Fund Global 
Management costs for GPFG is defined by NBIM to represent all operating cost directly 
related to the asset management of the fund’s portfolio (NBIM, 2014a). Figure 6 describes 
the reported allocation of management cost for the fiscal year of 2013. In 2013 the total 
management costs for the fund was 0.066% of the fund’s value, 0.016% of these were 
performance-based fees to external asset managers. 
 
Figure 6) Allocation management costs for the GPFG 2013 (NBIM, 2014a) 
Management costs of 2014 are estimated to be 0.075%, whereas the upper limit determined 
by the Ministry of Finance is 0.090%. NBIM’s ability to outperform the Ministry of 
Finance’s restrictions indicates the organization’s focus on cost reduction and effectiveness.          
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Table 4) Historical Management Cost in percent reported for the GPFG 
(Finansdepartementet, 2014a)  
The GPFG’s historical management costs are presented in Table 4 above. The total average 
of 0.09% is incorporated in the empirical analysis. Historical cost below 0.10% is regarded 
as low, compared to other actively managed portfolios (see argumentation for Norfund). 
Hence, the GPFG can be interpreted as a low cost fund, compared to other actively managed 
portfolios. This interpretation is also supported by the public discussion for the fund. For 
example does Scott (2014) discuss how the GPFG can be deemed as an active owner, 
performing a passive investment strategy in Financial Times 6
th
 of April 2014. Scott argues 
that a fund can be perceived as an active owner, for example by exclusion of corporations 
with undesirable characteristics, and at the same time conduct a passive investment 
approach. Exclusion of enterprises with unwanted behaviour is currently an essential 
sanction for the GPFG, which are predicted to be even more important as the fund continues 
to grow (Dimson et al., 2013).           
Norfund 
Historical management cost for Norfund has been estimated from annual reports published 
from 2008-2013. According to Norfund’s financial reports and notes, “total operating 
expenses” contains wages, salaries, other payroll expenses and other operating expenses 
(Norfund, 2013). Hence, the post corresponds to GPFG’s post of management cost related to 
the portfolio management. To make the management costs for the two funds comparable, it 
is reasonable to compute Norfund’s ratio for management cost based on the fund’s total 
operating expenses over total invested portfolio.  
 
Table 5) Historical management cost ratios Norfund in percent, cost in 
millions NOK (Norfund, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014a) 
Table 5 indicates the development in Norfund’s operating costs. The growth of the portfolio 
will increase the operational expenses, but we observe a slight decline in computed ratio for 
management costs. This can be interpreted as an effect due to economics of scale, the size of 
GPFG 2013 Last 3 years Last 5 years Last 10 years 1998-2013
Management cost 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.1 0.09
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Average
Total operating costs 74 79 78 114 106 127 96.33
Total invested portfolio 4798 5264 5844 7580 8295 9631 6902
Management cost ratio 1.54 1.50 1.33 1.50 1.28 1.32 1.41
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the fund increases the effectiveness of the asset management. The observed decline is a 
positive trend regarding future predication of the fund’s profits. The computed rates in Table 
5 will be applied for the further analysis of returns deducted for management costs. It has not 
been possible to obtain information on the operational cost for the period 2002-2008. 
Therefore the rate of 2008, 1.54%, will be applied as an estimate for this period. 
From researching other similar funds investing in emerging markets and private equity, 
management costs and fees has ranged from 2-3%
10
 (DnB, 2014; Odin Forvaltning, 2014; 
Skagenfondene, 2012). Even though some of these peers are in greater extent 
commercialized, it still gives an indication of the level of actively management costs in the 
investment banking sector. Hence, the initial thought for this report was that Norfund’s 
management costs must at least exceed 2%, bearing in mind the risk profile and active 
management of the portfolio. However, internal sources have confirmed that the above 
calculations of management cost ratios do correspond with the fund’s estimates of 
management costs.   
4.2 Credibility of the sampled data 
Credibility is associated to the evaluation of the obtained data for the analysis. The term can 
be divided into two sections: Reliability and Validity (Saunders, Thornhill, & Lewis, 2009). 
Each of the terms will be defined with examples from the acquired data sample in the 
following paragraphs.  
4.2.1 Reliability 
Reliability describes to what extent the analysed data will result in consistent findings when 
applied in other studies (Saunders et al., 2009). In regards of both of the funds, especially 
Norfund, there is reasons to believe that the economies of scale will be further enhanced 
causing the portfolio management to be more efficient. When cost structure and returns for 
                                                 
10  DnB Global Emerging Markets 1.80% 
    ODIN Emerging Markets           2.00% 
     Skagen Kon-Tiki                 2.93% 
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the funds has the ability to change in later periods, it is not possible to generalize the 
sampled data for related studies in the years to come. In addition, other studies could also be 
based on data where inflation and currency fluctuation where incorporated. In this report, the 
data has been processed in accordance with the funds stated objectives and guidelines.  
Norfund’s risk profile and mandate cause the fund’s returns to fluctuate over years, and this 
variation is also expected in the future. The country risk for the fund is assumed to be higher 
than for other traditional investors, as the investments are done in some of the poorest 
countries in the world. Norfund calculates with especially high risks for project in fragile 
states like Myanmar and South Sudan. Possible losses of such investing activities define the 
fund’s risk profile. This characteristic of Norfund impedes to generalize the findings to other 
funds for developing countries, for example if other funds’ holdings are diversified over 
different geographical regions.  
4.2.2 Validity 
The term “Validity” refers to how well a test measures what it is claimed to measure 
(Saunders et al., 2009). An example of validity affection on the sampled data is the financial 
crisis. By the construction of the GPFG’s benchmark portfolio, the fund’s returns must 
inevitably reflect the development in the world economy. This can be seen in GPFG’s 
graphed returns in Figure 7 (see Descriptive statistics) where the graph has a sharp drop 
around year of 2007-2008. The world economy was without doubt affected by recession in 
this period, where the Financial Crisis hit the financial markets the autumn of 2007. 
However, NBIM ability to reposition the portfolio by acquiring even more securities rather 
than panic selling was a successful strategy through the period. Acting like a stable 
countercyclical investor, exploiting its long-term characteristics, helped the GPFG to quickly 
recover from the Financial Crisis.      
Norfund’s returns do on the other hand not reflect the same trends as the GPFG. Note that 
the substitution of publically traded simple returns and IRR may affect this result. Annually 
calculation of unlisted investments’ IRR is not optimal for comparing Norfund with funds 
that holds public traded assets, as it not necessarily reflect the actual market price. Ideally the 
returns for Norfund should be based on market price of each company and investment at any 
time. Due to the illiquidity issues with private equity and other non-public traded assets, the 
IRR is probably the best estimate for the comparison. 
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In regards of the provided example, there are some concerns about the validity of the 
sampled data. The issue of comparing returns of public traded assets with IRR is particularly 
problematic. However, in regards to the Norfund’s characteristics and internal framework of 
evaluating the fund’s performance, this is deemed to be the best estimate for comparison.   
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 Empirical Analysis 5.
In this chapter the predictions from the simple neoclassical production model will be 
examined through empirical analysis. The first thing that needs to be analysed is the 
historical rates of returns for the two funds. This is done by first looking at the descriptive 
statistics and then by conducting a two-sample t-test allowing unequal variances. The t-test is 
designed to evaluate the differences in the funds’ means. Two t-tests are conducted, 
excluding and including management cost.  
5.1 Descriptive statistics  
Table 6 shows that the historical returns from 2002-2013 are somewhat higher for Norfund 
than GPFG. Norfund’s historical mean, exclusive costs, for the period was 7.86% while 
GPFG’s corresponding returns was 6.57%. The variance for Norfund’s sample was 
approximately 0.77% and for GPFG the variance was rounded to 1.53%. From Figure 7, the 
observed historical variance for the GPFG can be caused by the dramatic drop in returns 
prior to the financial crisis from 2007-2009, which cannot be observed for Norfund due to 
the valuation of its non-tradable assets, as discussed earlier.   
 
Table 6) Historical returns for the GPFG and Norfund, including means and 
variances (Finansdepartementet, 2014; NBIM, 2014a; Norfund, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013, 2014b) 
Year Returns ex. cost Man. cost Returns inc. cost Returns ex. cost Man. cost Returns inc. cost 
2002 -0.04740 0.00090 -0.04830 -0.04387 0.01540 -0.05927
2003 0.12590 0.00090 0.12500 0.06613 0.01540 0.05073
2004 0.08940 0.00090 0.08850 -0.01387 0.01540 -0.02927
2005 0.11090 0.00090 0.11000 0.03613 0.01540 0.02073
2006 0.07920 0.00090 0.07830 0.23613 0.01540 0.22073
2007 0.04260 0.00090 0.04170 0.16613 0.01540 0.15073
2008 -0.23310 0.00090 -0.23400 0.20613 0.01540 0.19073
2009 0.25620 0.00090 0.25530 0.03613 0.01500 0.02113
2010 0.09620 0.00090 0.09530 0.09613 0.01330 0.08283
2011 -0.02540 0.00090 -0.02630 0.07613 0.01500 0.06113
2012 0.13420 0.00090 0.13330 0.09613 0.01280 0.08333
2013 0.15950 0.00090 0.15860 -0.01387 0.01320 -0.02707
Mean 0.06568 0.00090 0.06478 0.07863 0.01476 0.06387
Variance 0.01528 0.00000 0.01528 0.00775 0.00000 0.00772
Government Pension Fund Global Norfund
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Figure 7) Rates of returns, management costs included 
(Finansdepartementet, 2014; NBIM, 2014a; Norfund, 2009, 2010, 2011, 
2012, 2013, 2014b)  
Table 6 also present the funds’ returns deducted for computed historical management cost. 
When introducing management costs, the difference between the funds decreases. Deducted 
for costs, the mean rate of returns for Norfund was 6.48%, slightly higher than GPFG’s 
6.39%. Due to the assumptions of the management cost being relatively constant for the 
period, there are no remarkable changes in the funds’ variances after deduction of costs.  
The requirements for the t-test, construction and the result are described in the following 
sections.  
5.2 Requirements for the t-test  
In order to compare returns and performance of the GPFG and Norfund, a two-sample t-test 
assuming unequal variances was defined. A t-test is a statistic used for investigating if the 
characteristics of two samples are significantly different from each other. The t-statistic is 
distributed in what is called a t-distribution, which is closely related to the standard normal 
distribution (Ubøe, 2008). The t-statistic is t-distributed if the population from which we 
have sampled is normal (Keller & Warrack, 2003). In other words, the distribution of the 
continuously returns for the funds, if it was possible to obtain. According to well-known 
financial fundament stock returns are assumed to be approximately normally distributed.   
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However for small samples, the normality requirement is loose in the sense that the t-test 
performs well as long as there are no outliers and departures from normality are not too 
extreme (Triola, 2011). To test this requirement, histograms were drawn to illustrate the 
frequencies of events in the samples, determining whether it is far from bell shape caused by 
normality. 
 
Figure 8) Frequency distribution of returns the GPFG 
 
Figure 9) Frequency distribution of returns Norfund 
Figure 8 and Figure 9 cannot be interpreted as perfectly bell shaped, the funds’ returns are 
rather positively skewed to the right. Nonetheless, the figures cannot be understood as too 
extreme departures from normality. Hence the requirements for the t-test are fulfilled, and 
there is no reason to discredit the robustness of the t-test.  
Although the requirements for the model are met, it is important to notice the implication of 
having a limited sample. In this case, the small amount of data will require high variation in 
the tested data sets or big differences in the sample means, to trigger a rejection of the null 
hypothesis. As an example, Norfund’s maximum constant management cost rate not to 
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change the results was identified to be approximately 11% for the sampled data. When 
testing for excess return needed for Norfund to change the test results, a rate of 
approximately 8% was observed. The unequal decisive rates are perceived to be caused by a 
slightly, not significant, higher initial mean of returns for Norfund. In a financial perspective, 
such differences in returns are interpreted as extreme. On the other hand, according to the 
predictions of the simple neoclassical model, such extreme differences are expected. Recall 
how the neoclassical prediction estimated the Norfund portfolio to deliver a 70 times higher 
capital return over the GPFG.  
This result gives an indication of how great the differences in the two funds’ returns must 
have been to be able to change the result, assuming the approximately same variance in the 
previous samples.    
5.3 Two-sample t-test assuming unequal variances  
The assessed two-sample t-test assuming unequal variances reveals if the observed 
differences in the means of the data are reliable. The test compares the variance within one 
group with the variance between the groups. When there is a big variance between two 
groups relative to the variance within the groups, the means of the two groups will be 
unequal (Midtbø, 2012). Hence, a big t-value is caused by the groups to be different, while a 
small t-value indicates the two groups to be similar.  
The test statistic for a two-sample t-test for unequal variances is given by equation 7):  
7      
  ̅   ̅           
√  
 
  
⁄  
  
 
  
⁄
 , 
where   ̅   ̅   is the difference of means in the sampled data, and          is the 
difference in hypothesis means. For this particular test,           , as it will examine 
whether or not the means are equal.   
  and   
  are the sampled variances and    and    is the 
sample sizes.        
The t-test is performed by analysing a null hypothesis against an alternative; matching the 
test statistic and a critical value. The choices for the statistic and critical value are based on 
convenience and the desire to maximize power given a significance level for the test. For 
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example, larger samples yield more information by producing more power to the test and 
narrow confidence interval estimator
11
,      
For a given test statistic, a rejection rule is defined to decide when    is rejected in favor of 
  . The rejection rule is based on comparing the resulted t-value with a critical value. To be 
able to determine the critical value
12
, a significance level for the test must be decided. For a 
given significance level, denoted    the critical value associated with this level is determined 
by the distribution of T, assuming   is true (Wooldridge, 2006). The significance level for 
the conducted t-test is 5%. The significance level represents the probability for rejecting a 
correct null hypothesis (Ubøe, 2008)  
A commonly used null hypothesis for such tests is that the mean in two distributions are 
equal. The null hypothesis for testing if the mean of returns for the GPFG and Norfund are 
equal, is stated:  
8)                     , 
where   denotes the mean. The corresponding alternative hypothesis is:  
9)                    . 
The alternative hypothesis    defines our test to be two-sided. A two sided test is suitable 
when any departures from the null hypothesis are relevant. For the two funds’ returns, the 
test must include all deviations from   . 
5.4 Findings  
In the following the result of the conducted t-test of the sampled data will be presented. In 
the first test the computed management costs are excluded from the returns, to get the best 
possible view of the actual financial performance of the funds before any costs deducted. 
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Then the calculated management costs were deducted in the second t-test, to assess whether 
the differences in the funds’ management cost possibly could modify the results of the first t-
test.  
5.4.1 T-test excluding management costs 
 
Table 7) t-Test returns exclusive management costs, α = 5% 
Table 7 presents the results for the two-tailed t-test at a 5% significance level, with a t-static 
rounded to 0.296. From the table above, the observed t-value is: 
–critical value < t < critical value, 
thus the two-tailed t-statistic do not exceed the absolute critical value, and there is no reason 
to reject the null hypothesis,                   .  
Table 7 also provides the test’s p-value. P-value is the probability that the pattern of data in 
the sample could be produced by random data. From Table 7 the p-value for the t-test is 
0.77, implying there is a 77% chance there is no real differences in the returns in the sample. 
The p-value can also be interpreted as the largest significance level to carry the test without 
rejecting the null hypothesis (Wooldridge, 2006). A p-value of 5% is usually regarded to 
reflect statistically significant differences in the average returns. Hence is also the p-value 
expression that there is no reason to discard the given null hypothesis for the test.  
The conclusion for the two-tailed t-test at a 5% significance level is to keep the initial null 
hypothesis. There is no significant statistic prove that the funds’ returns are different from 
each other.    
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances
GPFG Norfund
Mean 0.06568 0.07863
Variance 0.01528 0.00775
Observations 12 12
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0
df 20
t-Stat 0.29549
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.77067
t Critical two-tail 2.08596
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5.4.2 T-test including management costs 
 
Table 8) t-Test returns inclusive management costs, α = 5% 
Table 8 presents the results for the two sample t-test assuming unequal variances, including 
management cost, with a 5% significance level. As already mention in the section 6.1 
Descriptive statistics, the differences in mean returns for the two funds tend to diminished 
when deducting the management costs. In other words, Norfund’s relatively higher ratio of 
management costs entails the fund to be less attractive than first assumed by its initial 
calculations of returns.  
This results also implies that the t-statistic is decreased compared to the t-test excluding 
management costs. Recall how a small t-value representing similar groups. 
The conclusion to this t-test is similarly as the previous test: 
– critical value < t < critical value, 
and in addition, the p-value is observed to be 98.35%. The p-value states that there is a 
98.35% chance there is no real differences in the returns in the sample. Both the t-statistic 
and the p-value do clearly indicate that there is no reason to reject the null hypothesis.  
There is no statistical evidence for claiming any inequalities in the two funds’ returns. The 
summery of the provided hypothesis tests is that the difference in rate of returns is not 
significant. The null hypothesis remains valid,                   . This result does 
however not coincide with the predicted results from the simple neoclassical model, which 
states that return on capital for Norfund should be significantly higher than for GPFG.  
t-Test: Two Sample Assuming Unequal Variances
GPFG Norfund
Mean 0.06478 0.06387
Variance 0.01528 0.00772
Observations 12 12
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0
df 20
t-Stat 0.02091
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.98352
t Critical two-tail 2.08596
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 Why cannot the neoclassical predictions be 6.
observed?  
As stated from the provided empirical analysis, the results do not coincide with the 
predictions from the neoclassical theory. There is no statistically evidence for Norfund’s 
return to outperform the GPFG. Actually the sampled data does not indicate any significant 
differences in the returns of the assessed funds. Thus one cannot argue the predictions of the 
simple neoclassical production model nor the Lucas Paradox to be present in the sampled 
data. An evaluation of the differences between the neoclassical predictions and actual returns 
is nevertheless valuable to identify possible explanations for the observed mismatch. The 
discussion will incorporate arguments from Lucas (1990) and additional studies regarding 
the observed mismatch.   
The limitations for the simple production neoclassical model of production are accused to 
not reflect a real world situation, causing the model’s predictions to be less accurate. In that 
case, the simplifications of the model can be evaluated in order to explain the differences 
between the neoclassical predictions and the provided empirical findings. Challenging 
assumptions for the simple neoclassical model have been identified, interpreted to affect the 
observed return on capital of the funds’ investments. The simplifications identified to cause 
the difference between predictions and empirical findings are sectioned into topics of, 
Human Capital, Technology and Infrastructure & Institutions. The mentioned topics of 
explanations will be discussed in the following.    
6.1 Human Capital 
The possibility of differences in human capital is not taken into account in the simple 
neoclassical model. Differences in efficiency for labour input, often referred to as human 
capital per worker, will therefore not be reflected in the model’s predictions. When Lucas 
(1990) incorporated estimates for labour quality to the initial neoclassical model, the 
predicted capital return was reduced for poor countries. According to Lucas’ finding, 
differences in human capital can be a possible explanation for the mismatch between the 
neoclassical predictions and the empirical findings of the sampled data.   
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Figure 10 displays plots of tertiary education enrolment rates for the countries representing 
the GPFG’s and Norfund’s invested portfolios. The plots expressed a percentage of the total 
population, regardless of age, of the five-year age group following on from secondary school 
leaving. The data is the most recent available from the Word Databank, see Appendix. 2 The 
dark blue plots in the figure represent countries in the GPFG portfolio, while the light blue 
plots illustrates countries representative for Norfund’s investments. The figure illustrate a 
division between the two funds, as the countries representing the investment universe of the 
GPFG have a much higher gross tertiary enrolment ratio. If the tertiary enrolment ratio is 
defined as a measure of human capital, the plots expresses a clear evidence of differences in 
human capital for the two investment universes. The variety in the funds’ human capital can 
therefore explain the mismatch of the neoclassical prediction and the empirical findings.  
 
Figure 10) Gross tertiary enrolment ratio of the GPFG and Norfund (The 
World Bank Group, 2014c) 
6.2 Technology 
The simple neoclassical production function assumes constant level of technology, denoted 
A. In Lucas (1990) the average technology level was incorporated, changing the initial Cobb-
Douglas function. By including countries assumed level of technology, Lucas developed an 
alternative production function, involving the external effects of technology to the human 
capital. The new production function was shown to entirely eliminate the differences in 
predicted returns for the test countries in Lucas’ study.    
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The total factor productivity (TFP) is often used as a measure of technology of production, 
and its growth rate as an indication of technical progress (The World Bank Group, 2008). 
Figure 11 presents TFPs for regions representing the GPFG and Norfund. Even though the 
data is limited to Poncet’s (2006) studied countries (see Appendix 2), it still gives an 
indication of differences in technology for the two funds’ investment universes. Low values 
for the light blue plots illustrates countries of weak total factor productivity, while the dark 
blue plots illustrate that the GPFG have high values of TFP, hence level of technology.       
 
Figure 11) TFP for the GPFG and Norfund (Poncet, 2006) 
However, the simplest form of the neoclassical model which is used for the predictions in 
this thesis does not reflect the countries different levels of technology. Assuming equal 
technology in rich and poor countries is not considered appropriate. The observed 
technology gap is problematic as it is shown to exacerbate the capability of international 
business for example in areas like Sub Saharan Africa (Elmawazini & Nwankwo, 2012). 
Sub-Saharan Africa is identified as a region where Norfund is heavily involved (Library of 
Congress, 2010; Norfund, 2014c). 
The observed differences in TFP, hence technology, of the two funds’ investment portfolios 
can therefore be interpreted as a possible explanation of the mismatch between the 
neoclassical prediction and the empirical analysis.     
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6.3 Infrastructure and institutions 
Institutions can be defined as rules of play in a society and is given by both informal rules 
like traditions and culture, and formal rules like laws and constitutions. The shape of an 
economy is based on its institutions, interpreted as interactions between political, economic 
and social structures (Alfaro et al., 2008). The simple neoclassical model does not include 
institutional difference. Not incorporating this aspect can be interpreted to be rather 
unrealistic, as developing countries often are suffering by poor infrastructure and 
institutions.        
A thorough empirical analysis of the Lucas Paradox was conducted by Alfaro, Kalemli-
Ozcan and Volosovych in 2008. The study addressed institutional quality to be the leading 
causal variable explanation for the paradox, hence shaping international cash flows. The 
study claims poor institutions to entail uncertainty in returns or lack of productivity, causing 
investors to exclude these regions from their investments portfolio (Alfaro et al., 2008). 
Nations included in Norfund’s investment universe can be characterized to have weak forms 
of institutions and policies, which according to Alfaro et al. (2008) can cause a wedge 
between expected and actual returns.  
The Ease of Doing Business Rank (EDBR) is a system that ranks economies on their ease of 
doing business, in the range of 1-189. A high ranking indicates the country’s regulatory 
environment is conductive for operating and start-ups of local firms. The index is based on 
multiple indicators
13
, involving the quality of the nation’s infrastructure and institutions (The 
World Bank Group, 2014b). Therefore the index is assumed to be an appropriate 
measurement of institutional and infrastructural quality. In Figure 12 the EDBR of countries 
representing the investment universe of the GPFG and Norfund are plotted to illustrate the 
actual institutional and infrastructural situation for the portfolios (see Appendix 2). The plots 
of high values in the figure indicated countries which have been categorized with low 
ratings. For example has South Sudan obtained a rank of 186, hence the country has the forth 
worst institutional quality of the World Bank sample. The USA does on the other hand 
represent an institutional quality rank of 4, representing the fourth best country in the World 
Bank sample. The plot in Figure 12 does clearly indicate a difference in institutional quality 
                                                 
13 Starting a business, dealing with construction permits, getting electricity, registering property, getting credit, protecting 
investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts and resolving insolvency.    
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in the representing countries for the two funds. The investment universe of the GPFG, shown 
by the dark blue plot, is allocated close to the origin in the figure illustrating high ranking of 
institutional quality. The light blue plots representing Norfund in the figure is on the other 
hand located far out in the figure, indicating weak intuitions and infrastructure.                 
 
Figure 12) The Ease of Doing Business Ranking of the GPFG and Norfund 
(The World Bank Group, 2014b)  
Figure 12 can therefore be interpreted to confirm the initial idea of the funds’ investment 
universe to differ in terms of institutional quality. Thus the institutional differences for the 
portfolios identified as possible explanation for the difference between the neoclassical 
prediction and the empirical findings for the GPFG and Norfund.   
  37 
 The debate of  responsible investments 7.
Even though the empirical analysis did not provide any statistical evidence of Norfund to 
outperform the GPFG in term of simple returns, the critiques on the GPFG not to prioritize 
responsible investments are substantial. This chapter is therefore dedicated to provide some 
insights to the political debate regarding responsible investing. The insights are discussed in 
despite of the lack of empirical evidence of excess return compared to traditional profit 
maximizing asset management.  
The debate is especially important as the GPFG is identified as a leading institutional 
investor for responsible investments. Being a leader in the market entails the possibility to 
influence in further innovation of responsible investment in the market (KPMG, 2013). 
Acknowledging the fund’s impact and position is therefore a necessity for further adaption 
of responsible investments in the GPFG (Dimson et al., 2013). An example of this is 
NBIM’s and the Ministry of Finance’s ability to clearly communicate the fund’s 
management to international stakeholders.  
A common financial assumption is that highly risky assets must reflect a higher expected 
return compared to asset with lower risk (Bodie et al., 2011). Given from research by 
Campbell R. Harvey (2012), commissioned by the Ministry of Finance, there are reasons to 
believe that there are higher expected returns from investing in emerging markets relative to 
developed countries. Harvey claims the expected returns to reflect higher growth potential in 
these regions, but he also emphasises the assumed trade-off of risk and return. Emerging 
markets are argued to represent higher risk, for example regarding illiquidity and sensitivity 
to market volatility (Harvey, 2012). 
However, even if Norfund’s assumed higher risk is not seen to be significantly reflected in 
the returns in the sampled data, other possible trade-off can be discussed in a political 
perspective. These trade-offs indicate other reasons for responsible investments than 
increased returns. Examples for this are the trade-off of risk and development and the trade-
off of risk and long term returns.  
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7.1 Development 
In section 6.3 Infrastructure and institutions, differences in the quality of infrastructure and 
institutions was identified for the GPFG and Norfund. Investing in infrastructure and 
institutions is recognized to contribute in direct development and additionally make the 
regions more attractive to other international investors. As seen by the identified differences 
in human capital, technology, infrastructure and institutions in the previous chapter, the 
poorer regions is evidently in need of assistance to be able to change these differences. Thus 
can capital inflow contribute to reduce distortions in the world economy. An investor willing 
to offer long term capital can therefore be interpreted as a contributor of enhanced 
development growth in the countries. In that case, investments in poor countries can be 
expressed as a desire of contributing in development in challenged regions and reduce 
distortion between rich and poor economies.  
The private sectors’ role has been emphasised as an important stakeholder in economic 
development. The sector is claimed to contribute with job creation, gives access to critical 
goods, taxable revenues, enhanced services like health care and education, and make it 
possible for suffering people to escape poverty (International Financial Corporation, 2011). 
The fact that the GPFG’s mandate initially excludes investments in private equity has been 
heavily debated in media the last months. An overheated discussion played out after a 
possible huge loss from a private equity investment in the GPFG was detected, the so called 
Formel 1 investment
14
. The leader of the firm, Bernie Ecclestone, has previously been 
charged for corruptions, which contradicts with NBIM’s given mandate. CEO of NBIM, 
Yngve Slyngstad, has humbly apologized for the inconvenient, but NBIM nevertheless 
receives critique for its compliance of policies (NTB, 2014a, 2014b). The lack of 
transparency regarding the investment was also criticized, and several required the equity to 
be liquidated, especially as it was associated with illegal tax planning (Skaalmo, 2014; Tax 
justice network, 2014). Due to this incident the Formel 1 investment can be interpreted as a 
counterargument for private equity investment by the GPFG. Even though the Formal 1 
investment was based on other arguments that development, namely increased profits, the 
                                                 
14 In May 2012 NBIM purchased stocks for 1.8 billion NOK in Delta Topco, the company owning the rights of Formel 1. 
Nine days after the investment, the company abandoned the initial plan of going public, which was a prerequisite for NBIM 
to hold the assets according to its mandate.    
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example still enlightens some questionable issues of involvement in the private equity 
market. The current organization does not possess the resources to cope with such 
challenging markets. However, private equity investment can be adhered feasibly for such 
big and powerful investor like the GPFG. The relevant question is whether the Norwegians 
can tolerate the possibility of mistakes like the Formel 1 case, acknowledging that the private 
equity market is more risky and challenging than the fund’s current investment universe.  
7.2 Long term returns 
Another angle of the on-going discussion is how responsible investments today will entail 
long term returns. This argument can be based on how structural growth composition has 
implications for longer-term strategic allocation.  
Sony Kapoor did in his report claim that the majority of global growth is expected to be 
concentrated in developing countries, and therefore implies that the GPFG should reallocate 
towards these economies (Kapoor, 2013). A similar conclusion is also drawn by Harvey 
(2012), who suggests an increase in weights to 16%
15
. Kapoor is consequently puzzled by 
NBIM’s rejection of what he interprets as an “intuitive” conclusion. NBIM Discussion Note 
#5 2012 did however conclude that there is no significant relationship between economic 
growth and equity returns. The Discussion Note identifies the reason for this to be that there 
are differences in countries abilities of converting GDP growth into profit growth and that 
better growth prospects already are reflected in the market prices (NBIM, 2012). 
The result of the discussion note regarding growth and equity returns does however coincide 
with the Strategy Council’s report, addressing a lack of empirical confirmation on how a 
fund’s returns will be affected by further tilting the portfolio towards emerging markets 
(Dimson et al., 2013; NBIM, 2012). 
To sum up the above discussion it can be stated that, if the current mandate of the fund was 
tilted from profit maximization towards development objectives, the GPFG is definitely a 
perfect provider of the long-term capital which the challenged countries is in need for. 
However, changing the fund’s focus towards development would require great changes in 
                                                 
15 For the GDPF equity portfolio 9.8% was allocated to emerging markets per 31.3.2014   
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the organization, due to the fund’s size and lack of development expertise.  Regardless of the 
strategy, a clarification of the different roles of the organization will benefit the GPFG from 
being misunderstand and interpreted as a political instrument in the global economy (Dimson 
et al., 2013).        
 
 
 
 
 
  41 
 Summary Remarks  8.
In this thesis the rate of returns for the GPFG and Norfund has been analysed in order to 
evaluate the GPFG current strategy of responsible investments. A simple neoclassical model 
was conducted to predict the return on capital to the respective funds, claiming Norfund to 
outperform the GPFG.  
However, after researching the two funds’ actual historical rates of returns, the empirical 
analysis does not coincide with the neoclassical prediction. According to the empirical 
analysis there is no statistic significant evidence supporting the two funds’ mean of returns to 
be unequal. Acknowledging the two funds’ return on capital to be statistically equivalent 
implies that neither the prediction from the simple neoclassical model nor the Lucas Paradox 
can be observed in the sampled data. The model’s limitation regarding human capital, 
technology, in infrastructure and institutions was identified as possible explanation for the 
difference in the neoclassical predictions and the empirical finding. 
The discussion in the last chapter enlightens the ongoing debate of responsible investment in 
the GPFG. A clarification of these concerns is helpful to understand the criticism of the 
fund’s strategy, and the distinction of the development and long term return trade-offs. One 
noticeable part is the mentioned distinction of political and financial objectives for the asset 
management, acknowledging the fund’s size and impact. The Strategy Council does also 
states a necessity of further research on the impact on the returns of increased focus on 
responsible investments.  
A proposed further research in the context of this thesis is therefore a in depth assessment on 
the impact on the GPFG’s returns if a given proportion of the fund was liquidated in favour 
of directly investing in development financial institutions, like Norfund. To the extent of this 
thesis, such an additional analysis was not possible to obtain, realizing the complexity 
regarding termination of certain holdings and its effects on the fund’s return. The proposed 
approach was also considered in the initial phase of this thesis, but was not conducted as the 
main focus was to study whether or not such a strategy would be consistent with the fund’s 
overall profit maximizing objective. If the proposed further analysis is performed, it should 
be based on an acceptance of no significant evidence of Norfund outperforming the GPFG 
according to the conducted empirical findings of this report. 
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  APPENDIX  9.
9.1 Appendix 1 
For the purpose of this report, Norfund’s presented IRR is interpreted as the arithmetic 
average for each year. Thus, the IRR for each year can be derived to the corresponding 
geometric average of returns using a simplification, based on an assumption of normally 
distributed returns
16
:  
10)             
 
 
  , 
where    is the variance in the sample of IRR, the fiscal year of 2002-2013. The variance is 
calculated by the following formula:  
11)    
 
 
∑           ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
  
   , 
where n is years, and     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ is the average artimetric IRR for the sample period. 
 
Table 9) Artimetric and geometric IRR Norfund, excluding costs 
The table above shows the differences in the reported IRR of Norfund, the corresponding 
derived nominal geometric returns for Norfund. Table 9 confirms that the geometric annual 
mean for Norfund is 0.0387% less than the initial arithmetic reported return. 
                                                 
16 Terms for normal distribution is established in section 5.2 Requirements for the t-test 
Norfund arit. IRR Norfund geo. IRR
2002 -0.04000 -0.0439
2003 0.07000 0.0661
2004 -0.01000 -0.0139
2005 0.04000 0.0361
2006 0.24000 0.2361
2007 0.17000 0.1661
2008 0.21000 0.2061
2009 0.04000 0.0361
2010 0.10000 0.0961
2011 0.08000 0.0761
2012 0.10000 0.0961
2013 -0.01000 -0.0139
Mean 0.08250 0.0786
Diff mean -0.00387
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Gross enrolment ratio. Tertiary 
The GPFG
USA 0.95
Japan 0.6
UK 0.61
France 0.57
Germany 0.57
Average 0.66
Norfund
Angola 0.07
Burundi 0.03
Comoros 0.11
Eritrea 0.02
Kenya 0.04
Lesotho 0.11
Madagascar 0.04
Malawi 0.01
Mozambique 0.05
Rwanda 0.07
Seychelles 0.01
Swaziland 0.06
Tanzania 0.04
Uganda 0.09
Zimbabwe 0.06
Average 0.054
Countries TFP
GPFG
USA 943
Japan 712
UK 683
France 683
Germany 634
Average 731
Norfund
Botswana 226
Kenya 38
Madagascar 30
Rwanda 34
South Africa 181
Tanzania 33
Uganda 34
Zambia 41
Zimbabwe 42
Average 73
9.2 Appendix 2  
The Ease of Doing Business Ranking 
The GPFG
USA 4
Japan 27
UK 10
France 38
Germany 21
Average 20
Norfund
Angola 179
Botswana 56
Burundi 140
Comoros 158
Eritrea 184
Kenya 129
Lesotho 136
Madagascar 148
Malawi 171
Mozambique 139
Namibia 98
Rwanda 32
Seychelles 80
South Africa 41
South Sudan 186
Swaziland 123
Tanzania 145
Uganda 132
Zambia 83
Zimbabwe 170
Average 126.5
